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Abstract—The case for a competitive market operated by a
Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and a Mobile Virtual Network
Operator (MVNO) is analysed in the paper. The resource that is
leased by the MNO to the MVNO is spectrum. The MNO and
the MVNO compete a` la Bertrand posting subscription prices
and the mobile users may choose to subscribe to one operator.
The scenario is modeled by a three-level game comprising a
bargaining game, which models the spectrum leasing by the
MNO; a competition game, which models the price competition
between the MNO and the MVNO; and a subscription game,
which models the subscription choice by the mobile users,
and the outcome of which may be either not to subscribe, to
subscribe to the MNO or to subscribe to the MVNO. The game
is solved through backward induction, and each level has a
specific solution concept: Shapley value, for the bargain; Nash
equilibrium, for the competition; and Wardrop equilibrium, for
the subscription. The paper assesses which conditions lead to an
equilibrium where the competition does take place, which are
expressed as restrictions for the spectrum leasing price agreed
at the bargaining, and the spectrum efficiency improvement
achieved by the MVNO. Furthermore, it argues that the amount
of the leased spectrum should be fixed exogenously in order to
achieve optimal user and social welfares.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cellular wireless networks are managed by operators which
have bought a license, giving them the exclusive right to
use a fixed part of the radio spectrum for their customers.
Regulatory rules initially prevented them to resale a part of
their license rights. This fixed distribution of the spectrum has
been criticized [1]. Spectrum sharing has been implemented in
many countries as the simplest way to allow a new potential
mobile operator to access the market. But the viability of such
a system has to be precisely studied. It has for example been
observed in practice that the MVNO integration has not always
been successful in different countries [2]: it appears that
horizontally structured markets (i.e., with several independent
participants contributing to the different levels of service
providing) offer greater possibilities for MVNO profitability
than markets where a vertically integrated incumbent controls
most of the supply chain.
In this paper, we focus on the interaction between an
MNO and an MVNO. More precisely, the paper deals with
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primary-secondary sharing [3]. In this setting, the MNO is
a Primary Operator (PO), having acquired a license which
gives it the right to use spectrum, while the MVNO is a
Secondary Operator (SO), which leases a fraction of the
spectrum licensed to the PO. The SO is assumed to have
deployed a new technology which allows a more efficient
use of the spectrum than the one used by the PO. While
authorizing the SO to use the PO’s spectrum will permit the
PO to get additional revenue from leasing its spectrum, it may
also induce losses due to customers leaving to the newcomer.
Increasing the leasing price may limit PO’s losses but it may
also then prevent the SO from getting any profits, and therefore
from entering the market. As a result, it is not obvious whether
the PO will let the SO use its spectrum without any regulatory
intervention. In particular, the price that the PO will charge
the SO has to be carefully chosen to optimize resource usage
while ensuring sustainability of the PO-SO association [4].
As the operators have conflicting interests, we consider the
modeling and analysis framework of non-cooperative game
theory [5], which studies the interactions between selfish actors
(also named players).
Our contribution is the introduction and analysis of a model
representing the economic interactions between the PO, the
SO, and the users, and in general investigating the viability
of such a system. We design a three-level game where at
the highest level the operators agree on the amount of leased
spectrum and the corresponding unit price; at the intermediate
level, the operators play on the price they will propose to users;
and at the lowest level users distribute themselves between
operators depending on price and QoS.
Pricing telecommunication services in general has been
the topic of an extensive literature. Most works look at a
monopolist provider and very few take care of the competition
for customers. When it comes to competition and secondary
usage, cognitive networks or MVNOs, the literature is to our
knowledge even more limited; see for instance [6], [7]. Com-
petition is taken into account in [8]–[10], although through
demand functions that include indirect effects. By contrast, we
explicitly model user utilities and behavior to deduce demands.
The closest related works are to our knowledge [11] and [12].
In those papers, the competition between the MNO and the
MVNO is also analyzed, but they differ from our work in
two aspects: first, congestion is measured by the response
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Fig. 1. Scenario.
time at a simple M/M/1 queue, while we consider here a
measure more representative of wireless networks. Second, the
higher-level interactions are based on contract setting, while
we consider here simple fixed-capacity, fixed-lease contracts
but focus on negotiations for revenue sharing. The paper also
improves on a previous publication [13], where a simpler
model was developed for analyzing the same scenario as here.
Actually, we here extend the analysis in two significant ways.
First, it models the bargaining between the operators over the
price of the leased spectrum. And second, it models the user
willingness to pay, while the previous publication did not, so
that users were unable to choose to subscribe to neither the
PO nor the SO.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next section
describes the scenario under analysis and develops the model,
specifying each one of the three phases that comprise the
game. Section III evaluates the different competitive equilibria
that may arise in the game, discussing the effect of the different
parameters on the game outcome and assessing the outcome
from the point of view of the welfare. And finally, Section IV
draws some conclusions.
II. MODEL
The basic model we will analyze is depicted in Fig. 1. It is
made of one PO and one SO which compete for the provision
to the users; and (tertiary) users that are assumed to have
dual terminals, so that no technology-related switching costs
are incurred when making the subscription decision. The PO
leases an amount of b MHz to the SO, keeping for itself the
rest, up to the total amount of its licensed W MHz. The SO
pays for that amount a price p m.u.1 per MHz. Users pay a
subscription fee to the operator they have decided to subscribe
to. A user would pay pp m.u. if she subscribed to PO service,
or ps m.u. if she subscribed to SO service. All three prices p,
pp and ps are referred to the same time period.
We assume that the operators compete a` la Bertrand [5],
that is, they are playing a one-shot simultaneous game where
1m.u.= monetary units.
PO and SO strategies are pp and ps, respectively. Unlike the
model presented in [13], where both the price p and the leased
spectrum amount b were exogenously determined, in the model
described below the leasing price p is the result of a bargaining
process between the PO and the SO. Finally, each user will
subscribe to the service providing the highest utility, which
will be shown to depend on the quality of service and on the
price. Assuming that the number of users (n) is high enough,
the individual subscription decision of each user will not affect
the utility perceived by the rest. Then, the equilibrium notion is
the so-called Wardrop equilibrium [14] [15], where users are
indifferent between choosing one operator or the other one,
and therefore no user has an incentive to switch. Unlike the
model presented in [13], users may choose not to subscribe to
any service. This issue will be discussed below.
The strategic interaction between the two operators and the
n users is modeled as a three-level multi leader-follower game.
A standard way to analyze this sort of games is by means of
backward induction: the game at the second phase is played
knowing—anticipating—what would be the outcome of the
game at the third phase; similarly, the game at the first phase
is played anticipating the outcome of the game at the second
phase. We now show how the outcomes of those games can
be computed.
A. Subscription game—third phase
In this phase, a pair of values b and p has been agreed and
the prices pp and ps have been announced.
The utility that the users receive from each operator depends
on three factors:
Basic willingness: following [16], we assume that the users
are heterogeneous in their basic willingness to pay for the
service, but homogeneous in their valuation of the quality of
the service. Specifically, we model the basic willingness as a
random variable τ with a complementary distribution function
which is exponentially decreasing2:
F cτ (x)  P (τ > x) =
{
1 if x < 0,
e−ax if x ≥ 0, (1)
where a is a parameter which denotes the decreasing gradient
for the complementary distribution function: the larger a, the
more steeply the function decays.
Quality of service: each operator exploits, during each
subscription period, an amount of spectrum which is agreed
at the end of the first phase: b for the SO and W − b
for the PO. Furthermore, each operator is assumed to use
a different technology, which results in different levels of
spectral efficiency: k(p) and k(s) are the spectral efficiencies
for the PO and the SO, respectively. Both the modulation
schemes and the medium access control mechanisms are
modeled by the numbers k(p) and k(s). We assume that
k(p) < k(s), i.e. the SO uses a more efficient technology than
the PO. The product of the spectrum by the spectral efficiency
2This distribution allows for a simpler analytical processing than the more
common uniform distribution.
for each operator, divided by the number of users which
subscribe to it, will give the transfer rate that is offered to each
user [17]. We propose to use this transfer rate as the quality
factor (Qp and Qs) contributing to the user utility, through
an increasing concave (logarithmic) function. Specifically,
Qp = log
(
k(p)(W − b)/np
)
, Qs = log
(
k(s)b/ns
)
, where np
(resp., ns) is the number of users subscribing to the PO—resp.,
the SO.
Price: the higher the subscription price, the lower the user
utility. We consider quasi-linear user utility functions: the
utility is the difference between the value of the service and
the price paid.
Consider a user with willingness to pay τ . Based on the
above discussion, the expressions for that user utility if sub-
scribing to the PO or the SO are, respectively, Up = τ+Qp−pp
and Us = τ + Qs − ps. A selfish user will subscribe to the
service provided by the PO rather than the SO if Up > Us,
and reciprocally.
As stated above, at a user (Wardrop) equilibrium, the n∗p+n∗s
users which subscribe to a service should spread between the
PO and the SO such that no user has an incentive to switch
to the competing operator. For this to happen, Up = Us must
hold for every subscriber, or equivalently Qp− pp = Qs− ps.
Let α denote the fraction of subscribers that subscribe to the
PO, and 1− α, to the SO.
Additionally, only those n∗p + n∗s users which have a basic
willingness high enough so as to obtain a positive utility will
subscribe to the service. We now introduce the fraction β 
(n∗p +n
∗
s)/n of users that subscribe to the service. After some
manipulations, the following expression can be obtained
β =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if pp ≤ pˆp,(
k(p)(W−b)
nα e
−pp
) a
a+1
if pp ≤ pˆp,
(2)
where pˆp = log
(
k(p)(W − b)/(nα)). The interested reader is
referred to [18] for the detailed derivation of the expression.
Then np and ns can be expressed as functions of β and α as
np = αβn and ns = (1− α)βn.
B. Price competition game—second phase
In this phase, a pair of values b and p has been agreed
on, and each operator chooses its pricing strategy so as to
maximize its profits. The outcome of the subscription game is
assumed to be anticipated by both operators, and taken into
account in the pricing decisions.
The profits of the PO and the SO can be expressed, respec-
tively, as Πp = np ·pp+p ·b−Cp and Πs = ns ·ps−p ·b−Cs.
where Cp and Cs are the management—and infrastructure for
the PO—costs born by the PO and the SO, respectively.
When solving the equilibrium equations for the second and
the third phase, np and ns may be expressed as functions of
pp and ps, so that operator profits are functions of pp and ps
only: Πp = Πp(pp, ps), Πs = Πs(pp, ps).
Now, turning our attention to the pricing game, the equilib-
rium strategies p∗p and p∗s are given by the Nash equilibrium
conditions [5]: Πp(p∗p, p∗s) ≥ Πp(pp, p∗s), ∀pp; Πs(p∗p, p∗s) ≥
Πs(p∗p, ps), ∀ps; meaning that no operator can unilaterally
increase its profits by a price change.
Under the assumption that the partial derivatives of Πp and
of Πs with respect to pp and ps exist, the Nash equilibrium
can be determined by looking at the solutions of the first-
order conditions. After some algebra, the following equation
is obtained for α∗, the fraction of subscribers selecting the PO
at the equilibrium:
logα∗ +
a + 1
a + 1− α∗ = log(1− α
∗)
+
a + 1
a + 1− (1− α∗) + log
(k(p)(W − b)
k(s)b
)
. (3)
Note that the function f(x) = log x+ a + 1
a + 1− x is continuous,
increasing for x > 0 and that limx→0 = −∞. We can then
infer that there exists a unique value of α ∈ (0, 1) which
satisfies (3).
C. Operators bargaining—first phase
As stated at the beginning of this section, the price p and
the amount of spectrum b are subject to a bargaining process
between the PO and the SO, which is conducted before the
subscription prices are advertised by the operators and the
subscription decision is performed by the users.
Following [19], we model the bargaining as a non-
cooperative game where the incumbent operator (the PO)
has full bargaining power and therefore offers a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the entrant operator (the SO). For the sake
of simplicity, we stand by the full bargaining case, although
alternative assumptions are possible, as discussed later.
The game is analyzed as a dynamic game in an extensive
form. Following backward induction, depending on the values
of (b, p) which characterize the PO offer, the bargaining
outcome is characterized as follows:
1) The PO will make an offer only if it prefers the compe-
tition outcome compared to the monopolistic outcome,
that is, Πp ≥ Πm.
2) If the offer made by the PO induces Πs ≥ 0, the SO
will accept the offer. Otherwise, Πs < 0, and the SO
will refuse it.
To compute Πm, the problem should be stated as an optimal
decision problem, such that the optimal price p∗m should fulfill
Πm(p∗m) ≥ Πm(pm), ∀pm. Then we obtain p∗m = 1+1/a and
Πm(p∗m) =
n
e
(
1 +
1
a
)(
k(p)W
n
) a
a+1
− Cp. (4)
We now proceed to define the feasibility region of values
(b, p) which allow for a competitive equilibrium to result.
From the condition Πs ≥ 0, we derive:
p ≤ U(b)  n(1− α
∗)p∗s
b
(
k(p)(W − b)
nα∗
e−p
∗
p
) a
a+1
− Cs
b
.
(5)
From the condition Πp ≥ Πm, we get:
p ≥ L(b)  n
b
(
k(p)W
n
ec
) a
a+1
·
((
1 +
1
a
)
e−1 −
((
1− b
W
) 1
α∗
e−p
∗
p
) a
a+1
α∗p∗p
)
. (6)
Again the detailed derivation of the expressions may be found
at [18]. Therefore, a non-empty feasibility region will exist if
L(b) ≤ U(b) and a point (b, p) will be in the feasibility region
iff
max
(
0, L(b)
) ≤ p ≤ U(b). (7)
The final bargaining outcome will depend on the specific as-
sumptions made over the bargaining process. If the incumbent
has full bargaining power, it will ask for a profit-maximizing
price p, i.e. such that the equality holds in (5), p = U(b).
Given that Πp is monotonically increasing on the value p, this
would provide the incumbent with maximum profits.
Apart from the full bargaining power case, other solution
concepts can be borrowed from the cooperative theory for
choosing the value of p. By noting that Πp
∣∣∣
p=L(b)
= Πm
and Πs
∣∣∣
p=U(b)
= 0, the expressions for Πp and Πs can be
rewritten as Πp = Πm +
(
p − L(b))b and Πs = U(b) − p,
from what it follows that Πp + Πs = Πm + Δ, where
Δ =
(
U(b) − L(b))b ≥ 0 is the amount by which the total
profit is incremented if the SO enters the market. Note that Δ
does not depend on p.
We have then transformed the problem of setting the price
p at which the PO sells bandwidth to the SO, to an equivalent
one of deciding how the extra profit Δ is shared between
the PO and the SO. For this equivalent problem, the Shapley
value [20] provides a fair allocation of the payoff obtained by
the PO–SO coalition, such that each operator (PO or SO) will
receive a share of the profits proportional to its contribution to
the total profits. More precisely, each operator will receive the
profits it would get if alone and half of the profits increase that
its presence brings to the total profits in case of a coalition.
In our case, the Shapley value allocation yields
Πp =
1
2
Πm +
1
2
(Πm + Δ− 0) = Πm + Δ2 , (8)
Πs =
1
2
0 +
1
2
(Πm + Δ−Πm) = Δ2 , (9)
which correspond to
p =
U(b) + L(b)
2
. (10)
Alternatively, the problem of agreeing a value for p can
be casted into a two person bargaining problem in which the
disagreement point is (Πm, 0) and the players’ strategies are
their offers about p. In this setting, both the Nash bargaining
solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution [20]
can be computed and it can be shown that they yield the same
results as the provided by the Shapley value (see (8) and (9)).
TABLE I
DEFAULT PARAMETER SETTING
Parameter Value Parameter Value
n 100000 users k(p) 1 bit/s/Hz
W 100 kHz k(s) 1.2 bit/s/Hz
Cp 10 u.m. a 1.7
Cs 5 u.m.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5
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Fig. 2. Upper and lower limits for the feasible values of p.
Note, however, that the value b is not determined by the
bargaining, but only constrained by L(b) ≤ U(b). As shown
in the next section, welfare—either producer welfare, user
welfare or social welfare—can determine the value b.
III. RESULTS AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the different competitive equilibria, we
propose to use the following indicators:
1) Operators profits Πp and Πs.
2) User utilities, UTp and UTs , computed as the expected
values over those users that subscribe to the PO and to
the SO, respectively.
3) User welfare, UW , computed as the aggregated user
utility over the total number of subscribers.
4) Social welfare, SW , computed as the sum of the user
welfare and the producer welfare—i.e., SW = UW +
Πp + Πs.
We have conducted a series of numerical experiments in
order to obtain a better understanding of the scenario from
the point of view of the economic interactions. The values for
the parameters, if not stated otherwise, are the ones shown in
Table I.
A. Feasible values for (b, p)
The objective of this experiment is to characterize the
feasibility region for (b, p), that is, to find values (b, p) where
condition (7) is satisfied. Figure 2 shows the values of U(b),
given by (5), and L(b), given by (6), as functions of b.
We see that for values of b greater than a threshold value
bmin, L(b) < U(b) holds and, therefore, corresponding values
for p can be found such that the competition setting results in
an equilibrium. More formally, a feasibility region F can be
found such that
F  {(b, p)|bmin ≤ b ≤ bmax ≤ W,L(b) ≤ p ≤ U(p)}
(11)
where bmin is such that L(bmin) = U(bmin).
B. Spectral efficiency
We now assess the effect of k(s) on the feasibility region
(b, p). We have tested 1 ≤ k(s) ≤ 1.2. The case k(s) = 1.2
was shown in the previous section, and the case k(s) = 1 is
shown in this section. Figure 2 shows again U(b) and L(b),
as functions of b.
We see that, for the whole range of values of b, L(b) > U(b)
holds, so that there is no pair of values (b, p) which results in
a competitive equilibrium.
The result can be explained as follows. In the experiment,
k(s) = k(p), which means that the SO operator has not
innovated in technology with respect to the PO operator. There
is no incentive for either the PO or the SO to engage in a
competition. Note that a similar conclusion has been achieved
by [21], where the entry conditions of MVNOs are analyzed
when incumbent MNOs exist: the latter do not have any
incentive to lease network capacity unless the former chooses
to provide differentiated services to the mobile users.
C. On the value of the leased spectrum
The objective of this experiment is to evaluate the effect of
varying the amount of leased spectrum b. We assume that p is
agreed so that the Shapley value result for the profits sharing.
The following values are simultaneously represented as
functions of b on Fig. 3: α and β, UTp and UTs , and Πp and
Πs, where the left y-axis is for α and β and the right one is
for UTp and UTs . When b < bmin, meaning that it does not
yield a competitive equilibrium, the represented values for the
PO correspond to the monopolistic scenario.
We see that, with respect to the number of subscribers,
throughout the interval [0, bmin), the PO remains as the
monopolistic operator, i.e. α = 1 holds. When b ≥ bmin,
the SO operator enters the market, and the PO operator loses
market share as b increases, down to α = 0 when b = W .
The number of subscribers in a competitive setting is always
greater than in a monopolistic setting. Furthermore, β reaches
a maximum at an intermediate value bmin < b′ < W .
With respect to profits Πp and Πs, both operators increase
their profits as the SO enters the market. Furthermore, they
keep increasing as the SO operator gets more resources (b >
bmin) for providing service to its users.
With respect to utilities UTp and UTs , the utility for the PO
users does not change when the SO operator enters the market.
Then, when competitive equilibrium is feasible, both utilities
match UTp = UTs , and stay constant as b increases. Actually,
it can be shown that UTp = UTs = 1/a. When the results for
both the number of subscribers (β ·n) and the user utilities are
jointly considered we can conclude that user welfare (UW )
reaches a maximum at the same value b′ as β.
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Fig. 3. Effect of variation of b/W
The above conclusions are valid regardless of the criteria
used for fixing p. In this experiment, the value p is ob-
tained from (10). For any other value of p, specifically for
p = U(b)—i.e. the incumbent has full bargaining power, the
profits Πp and Πs would obviously be different. Nevertheless,
the producer welfare, the equilibrium prices and the number
of subscribers remain the same as those just represented and
discussed, and so do consequently the user utility, the user
welfare and the social welfare.
D. Welfare-maximizing values for the leased spectrum
Finally, we proceed to evaluate the optimum values b of
leased spectrum from the point of view of welfare. Specifically,
we have computed and represented the following values in
Fig. 4:
• Maximum value of b/W in the feasibility region
(bmax/W ).
• Minimum value of b/W in the feasibility region
(bmin/W ).
• Value of b/W such that user welfare is maximized
(bUW /W ).
• Value of b/W such that social welfare is maximized
(bSW /W )
We have performed different experiments varying a, which
is the parameter of the basic user willingness (see Eq. (1)).
We see that, in all cases, the value b/W can reach the
value 1, which is the case where the whole spectrum W is
leased by the SO. In other words, bmax = W in (11). As
regards bmin/W , as a increases, bmin tends to zero, which
would imply that even a small amount of leased spectrum
would be profitable for the PO and the SO.
As regards the user welfare and the social welfare, we can
identify five different zones in the graph, depending on the
value of parameter a:
• In the first zone, both bUW and bSW equal bmin, which
means that the optimum for the users and for the whole
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
0.2
0.4
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0.8
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b
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Fig. 4. Leased spectrum values which yield maximum user welfare and
maximum social welfare
is that the PO leases the minimum amount of spectrum
so that the entry is profitable for both PO and SO.
• In the second zone, bUW equals bmin but bSW detaches
itself from bmin, which means that the optimum for the
whole is now bmin < bSW < bmax.
• In the third zone, bUW detaches itself from bmin, which
means that the optima for the users and for the whole are
intermediate values between bmin and bmax.
• In the fourth zone, bSW reaches bmax = W , so that the
optimum for the whole system is that the PO leases the
total amount of spectrum to the SO, whereas the optimum
for the users is not to lease that much.
• In the fifth zone, not shown in the graph, bUW also
reaches bmax = W , so that the optimum for the users
is also that the PO leases the whole amount of spectrum
to the SO.
The above results mean that the degenerate case b/W = 1,
which is the optimum from the point of view of the producer
welfare, is not always the optimum from the point of view of
either user welfare or social welfare. We would argue then
that a regulatory authority would have strong arguments—
i.e., welfare enhancement—to intervene by fixing a maximum
value b/W < 1 of leased spectrum. And these arguments are
independent on the procedure that implements the bargaining
on p.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The interaction between an MNO and an MVNO which
compete for mobile users and which trade spectrum is ana-
lyzed in the paper. A three-level game has been developed.
Bearing in mind the analysis of the results conducted in the
previous section, we can conclude that:
1) Every actor, that is, users and the two operators, may be
better off when the SO operator enters the market. For
this to happen, the values (b, p) should lay within the
feasibility region.
2) The entry of the SO operator is only feasible if it im-
proves the technology used by the incumbent operator.
3) The regulator intervention is deemed necessary in order
to restrain the incumbent operator from leasing the
whole amount of the spectrum to the entrant operator,
which will harm the users.
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